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The Direction of Causality between Insider Ownership and Market Valuation 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The causal relationship between insider ownership and market valuation is tested on a 
database of the largest EU and US companies. Using a Granger causality test insider 
ownership (measured by the fraction of closely held shares) is found to have a negative effect 
on market valuation (measured as the simple Tobin's Q ratio). And market valuation is found 
to have a negative effect on insider ownership. Consistent with an overall non-linear 
relationship as hypothesised by Morck et al. (1988) and Stultz (1988), the negative effect 
from insider ownership to performance is found to be significant only for companies with 
high initial levels of insider ownership, but insignificant for companies with low initial 
concentration levels. Furthermore, the effect on market valuation turns out to depend on 
system affiliation: it is only significant in continental Europe where average insider 
ownership is much higher than in the Anglo-American world (UK and US).  
 
JEL classifications: G32, L20 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
An enormous number of papers have addressed the relationship between ownership structure 
and market valuation. Generally these studies have examined the impact of ownership 
structure on market valuation in simple regression models. But recently a second generation 
of research (Loderer and Martin, 1997; Cho, 1998; Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia, 1999) 
has built on a point raised by Harold Demsetz (1983): that ownership is an endogenous 
variable and that this must be taken into account in empirical estimation. The second-
generation papers have used more sophisticated simultaneous equation models and concluded 
that the impact of ownership on performance is insignificant. This confirms the intuition 
voiced by Demsetz (1983): there should be no impact in equilibrium since this would imply 
that owners/investors would profit by reshuffling their portfolios. In particular, one might 
expect a significant reverse feedback from market valuation to ownership structure as owners 
react to good or bad performance by buying or selling shares. 
 
While previous studies have attempted to infer causality from cross-sectional data sets, 
causality is more readily understood as a process in time (cause preceding effect). This paper 
contributes to the ongoing research in this field by applying Granger causality tests (Granger 
1969) to examine the causal relationship between insider ownership and market valuation.  
We analyse time series data on ownership  (the fraction of shares that are “closely held”) and 
market valuation (the simple Tobin's Q ratio) over a 10-year period (1988-1998) for 876 of 
the largest EU and US companies. We find evidence of fairly strong negative effects going 
both ways: a negative effect of insider ownership on market valuation, and a negative effect 
of market valuation on insider ownership. However, these results are moderated both by the 
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initial level of insider ownership and by the system effects (common law contra civil law 
system). 
 
 
2. THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Suppose there is a privately optimal fraction of insider ownership, which involves a trade-off 
between risk and incentive efficiency (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Demsetz, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Ceteris paribus, larger owners will have a 
stronger incentive to monitor managers and more power to enforce their interests and this 
should increase the inclination of managers to maximise shareholder value. But generally the 
owner's portfolio risk will also increase the larger the ownership share. Furthermore, insider 
ownership above a certain level may lead to entrenchment of  managers and majority 
shareholders who can expropriate the wealth of minority shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Morck et al., 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Presumably, this optimal ownership 
share will differ from company to company because companies differ in terms of specific risk 
and the complexity of their activities (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985).  
 
Essentially, this means that the relationship between ownership structure and market value 
will vary across companies and industries as a function of company size, firm-specific 
uncertainty, risk and other factors that need to be verified empirically. If owners have already 
adopted an optimal (shareholder value maximising) ownership structure, little can be learned 
from empirical studies that correlate ownership structure with market valuation. But if inertia, 
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agency problems or other factors lead to an imperfect adjustment to shareholder value 
maximization, there is greater scope to learn from empirical studies. 
 
The consequences of insider ownership for the economic performance of companies have 
been studied empirically since Berle and Means (1932). While earlier studies tended to find a 
positive association between owner control and accounting profitability (Cubin and Leech, 
1983; Short, 1994), Demsetz and Lehn (1985) found no significant effect of ownership 
concentration on equity returns when controlling for determinants of ownership structure, and 
subsequent studies on international data have confirmed their findings (Bergstrøm and 
Rydkvist, 1990; Gerson and Barr, 1996; Pedersen and Thomsen 1999). Nevertheless several 
studies - mainly on market data - have continued to find significant, although sometimes 
conditional and non-linear effects (Lloyd, Hand and Modani, 1987; Zeckhouser and Pound, 
1990; Oswald and Jahera, 1991; Li and Simerly, 1998; Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and 
Servaes, 1990; Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). More recently, a second generation of research 
(Loderer and Martin, 1997; Cho, 1998; Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia, 1999) has disputed 
the relevance of these findings and reported insignificant performance effects in simultaneous 
estimations of causes and effects of insider ownership.  
 
Loderer and Martin (1997) examine both Tobin’s Q-values and abnormal stock returns to 867 
acquisitions made by companies listed in the US from 1978-1988. They find a weak concave 
effect of director ownership on both performance measures when estimated by simple 
regression. However, the effect becomes insignificant when a simultaneous two-equation 
model is estimated that includes firm size and earnings volatility as determinants of director 
ownership. Abnormal acquisition returns are found to have a significant positive effect on 
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director ownership whereas Q-values are found to have a significant negative effect. The 
authors interpret these results as evidence that managers have inside knowledge and increase 
their shareholdings prior to good acquisitions whereas high share prices and Q-values induce 
them to sell out.  
 
Cho (1998) examines investment as an intermediate variable between director ownership and 
performance measured by Q-values. On a sample of 326 Fortune 500 firms in 1991, he finds 
that Q-values have a positive impact on director ownership and that director ownership has a 
significant non-monotonous effect on investment, which again has a positive impact on Q-
values. When taking this into account in a three-equation model simultaneously determining 
director ownership, Q-values and investment, the non-monotonous effect of ownership 
structure on Q-values becomes insignificant. 
 
Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) use a panel of 300 Compustat firms over the period 
1982-1992 to control for fixed firm effects as an indicator of unobserved firm heterogeneity 
which influences both ownership structure and Q-values. They find a significant impact of 
director ownership on Q-values even after controlling for some observable determinants of 
ownership structure, but the impact becomes insignificant when the fixed firm effects are 
taken into account.  
 
In summary, empirical research has tended to find a positive direct effect of insider 
ownership or similar measures such as director ownership, ownership concentration, or 
owner-control dummies. But the effect appears to be insignificant when attempts are made to 
control for the determinants of ownership structure (when ownership is treated as an 
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endogenous variable). Therefore, the effect of ownership structure on market values is still 
unresolved. 
 
 
3. METHODOLOGY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
While previous studies have relied mainly on cross-section data, this paper applies a time 
series analysis to test whether changes in insider ownership are followed by changes in 
market valuation and vice versa. We apply a Granger (1969) test to explore the causal 
relationship between insider ownership (OS) and market valuation (Q). One standard 
requirement for causality is that changes in the cause variable should precede changes in the 
effect variable, and Granger causality analysis essentially tests for this. To apply a Granger 
causality test for causality we consider the information sets It, t=1,…, 10 with It = 
{(Qô,OSô)}ô<t,  Qt  and OSt  denoting respectively the performance and the ownership at time t. 
Restricting attention to linear prediction with squared error loss we consider the models 
(1)  Qt   =  a1 + b1 OSt-1 +  b2 Qt-1 +  m1t 
(2)  OSt =  a2 + b3 OSt-1 + b4 Qt-1 +  m2t 
The a´s and b´s are parameters of the models, and m1t and m2t are uncorrelated error 
processes.  In these models if b1 ¹ 0, b4 = 0 we infer unidirectional OS to Q. In this case 
including OS as a predictor for Q will decrease the prediction error (or increase explained 
variance). Similarly, if b1 = 0, b4 ¹ 0 we infer unidirectional causality from Q to OS, while if 
b1 ¹ 0, b4 ¹ 0 we infer bi-directional causality between Q and OS.  To implement the tests we 
assume normality of errors, homogeneity of variance, condition on the first observation 
(Q1,OS1) and use OLS. b4 is significant and b1 is not.  
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One of the advantages of this approach is that a number of structural factors that influence 
both present and lagged values of Q and OS are controlled for by including the lagged value 
as an explanatory variable. However, it is clear that both changes in ownership and market 
valuation may be accompanied by changes in other variables. Major changes in ownership 
structure may be accompanied by major changes in corporate strategy and other variables that 
are difficult to measure: for example when new block-holders convince the board to spin off 
loss-making business units. The market may respond positively, but it is not necessarily clear 
whether it responds to a change of strategy or to the ownership change. To filter out effects 
that are not attributable to Q and OS respectively, we have reported results that also include 
firm and time effects (i.e. the panel data analysis allows for random firm and time effects). 
 
Theoretically, it might be argued that higher insider ownership implies better incentives to 
monitor and greater incentive alignment, and, therefore, higher expected profits and share 
prices. Since the risk of an unbalanced portfolio will mainly be borne by the insider-owner 
rather than the company, this prediction is not inconsistent with market equilibrium if the 
insider-owner gets private benefits of control. But higher insider ownership may also imply 
greater managerial entrenchment, in which case private benefits of control might make a loss 
of market value acceptable to the insider-owner. And near a value-maximising optimum the 
marginal effect of changes in insider ownership could theoretically be zero. Although the 
predicted effects of changes in insider ownership are therefore uncertain, we formulate the 
following hypothesis for empirical testing. 
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Hypothesis 1.  Insider ownership positively Granger-causes market valuation (the incentive 
alignment hypothesis). 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
As previously mentioned, several previous studies have found non-linear relationships 
between managerial ownership and market valuation (e.g. Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and 
Servaes, 1990; Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). We recognise that the effects of changing 
insider ownership could depend on the initial level of concentration. At low levels of 
concentration, increasing ownership may imply increased monitoring, better incentive 
alignment, and a higher share price, whereas negative effects of increased entrenchment may 
be more important at high levels of insider ownership. We choose to explore these ideas by 
proposing the following hypothesis. 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Hypothesis 2. For high levels of insider ownership the effect is reversed: insider ownership 
negatively Granger-causes market valuation (non-linear effects hypothesis). 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Furthermore, the relationship between insider ownership and market valuation may also be 
contingent on system effects. In a series of influential papers La Porta et al. (1999a, 1999b) 
have argued that national legal systems differ with regard to investor protection, and that this 
has implications for insider ownership and market valuation. Others have emphasised the 
importance of complementary institutions (Roe 1991, 1994; Pedersen and Thomsen, 1997). 
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The legal systems approach advocated by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) seems to imply that 
insider ownership curbs agency problems in civil law countries that provide less investor 
protection through the legal system. But the high levels of insider ownership come at a price: 
large owners expropriate wealth from minority investors, because of managerial 
entrenchment, privileged access to inside information and because their large shareholdings 
make them more risk adverse than diversified minority investors. In civil law countries, the 
net effect of changes in ownership are therefore unclear; increasing insider ownership may 
imply reduced agency problems and higher market valuation, but also greater risk of 
expropriation of minority investors which should tend to lower market values. In contrast, if 
minority investors are better protected in common law countries, the positive effects of 
increasing insider ownership might be more pronounced - at least for equivalent initial levels. 
This leads to Hypothesis 3. 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Hypothesis 3. Increases in insider ownership will more likely Granger-cause market 
valuation in economic systems that protect minority investors better (system effects 
hypothesis). 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
There are also conflicting opinions regarding the reverse effect of a market value on insider 
ownership. Depending on the supply curve for individual stocks (Zeckhouser and Pound, 
1990), individuals may be more tempted to sell parts of their shares in a particular firm when 
share prices are high relative to expectations. For example, managers and other controlling 
shareholders may trade on-the-job consumption for monetary compensation. The immediate 
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gains of selling out are larger and the expected future gains may be lower for a higher share 
price. Furthermore, companies seem more likely to issue stock to the market and thereby 
reduce the level of insider ownership when the market for their shares is good (i.e. when 
share prices are high).  Finally, when caused by inefficient management a decreasing share 
price should in theory invite raiders and controlling shareholders to increase their holdings to 
repair the problem. These factors point to a negative effect of market valuation on the level of 
insider ownership. It is also conceivable, however, that outside shareholders choose to reward 
the insiders for good past performance (ex post settling up) and that high market valuation 
will therefore tend to lead to higher levels of insider ownership (Kole 1996).  Furthermore, 
higher market value makes it possible to finance a given level of investment with a smaller 
amount of stock to outsider owners (La Porta et al. 1999b). If the insiders want to keep as 
large an ownership stake as possible to align incentives  (La Porta et al. 1999b) or to avoid 
issuing too much new equity (Myers and Majluf 1984), this implies a positive effect of 
market valuation on insider ownership. Since the effect of market valuation on insider 
ownership is disputed, we suggest the following hypothesis for empirical testing. 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Hypothesis 4.  Market valuation positively Granger-causes insider ownership (insider 
preference hypothesis). 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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4.  DATA AND MEASUREMENT 
 
A description of the variables used is found in Table 1. The database is drawn from the 
Worldscope electronic database (Worldscope, annually) and consists of all EU and US 
companies which had net sales and net assets exceeding US$ 2 billion in 1998 and for which 
a year time series was available over the 1990-1998 period. The data set contains 876 
companies with nine years of observation giving a total of 7884 firm-year observations. 
 
Market valuation is measured by dividing the sum of the market value of equity and the book 
value of the total debt by the book value of assets. The Tobin’s Q measure of equity at 
replacement costs was not available, so we use an approximation denoted (the ”simple Q”) by 
Loderer and Martin (1997). However, Chung and Pruitt (1994) found that the correlation 
between the "simple Q" measure and a measure of Q that attempts to use market values 
throughout is as high as 0.97. To correct for a right-skewed distribution of the market 
valuation variable, we use log values. 
 
Insider ownership is measured by the percentage of ”closely held“shares to total shares 
outstanding (CHS). Closely held shares ”represent the shares held by insiders" (Worldscope 
1997) including officers, directors and their families, shares held in trust, shares held by 
another corporation (except in a fiduciary duty by banks), shares held by pension/benefit 
plans, or by individuals who hold more than 5%. This measure is somewhat broader than the 
director ownership variables used in many previous studies since it involves the holdings of 
other large investors apart from management. The main benefit of the measure is that it is 
available as a time series in the Worldscope database so we can use up to nine consecutive 
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years of observation for a large sample of US and European companies (n=876). Its main 
disadvantage is that it must involve some subjective judgement that we are generally unable 
to verify. However, in earlier studies we found quite a high correlation between closely held 
shares and another concentration measure (share of the largest owner) (Thomsen and 
Pedersen 2000). Since this measure is bounded between zero and 100 we use a logit 
transformation (see Table 1) to make the measure fit a normal distribution. 
 
In order to test for non-linear effect we split the data in two sub-samples: high and low initial 
insider ownership. The median of the level of insider ownership in 1990 (the first year of our 
data window) is 9.8 per cent (mean 6.6 per cent). We therefore split the sample in two 
groups: low insider ownership < 10 per cent and high insider ownership => 10 per cent. 
Furthermore, to test for differences in legal system (and the level of investor protection) we 
follow La Porta et al (1998) and distinguish between companies based in common law 
countries (US and UK) and civil law countries (continental Europe). 
 
 
5. RESULTS 
 
Table 2 provides a correlation matrix and some descriptive statistics. 
 
As might be expected, both Q-values and insider ownership (OS) are highly correlated with 
their lagged values with correlation coefficients well into the nineties. Insider ownership is 
negatively correlated with both present and lagged values of Q. Q-values are also negatively 
correlated with both present and lagged values of insider ownership. 
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As a direct Granger test we first estimated the simple model, with common slopes and 
intercepts for all firms:  
3.  Qit   =  a1 + b1 OSit +  b2 Qi(t-1) +  m1,it 
4.  OSit =  a2 + b3 OSi(t-1) + b4 Qi(t-1) +  m2,it 
the error terms m j,it being independent with variances sj
2 (j =1,2; t =1990, 1991…1998; i 
=1,2...876 firms). 
 
Since Q is measured at the end of the year, we assume that changes in insider ownership from 
t-1 to t are reflected in Q-values at time t. In contrast, Q is expected only to have an effect on 
insider ownership in the next period. The number of lags included reflects statistical 
significance: all variables lagging more than one period were found to be highly insignificant 
so we only report models with one lag. 
 
The model is estimated as an OLS regression model applying the SAS procedure GLM (SAS 
1999). The results of the direct Granger tests are reported in Table 3, model I. 
 
// Insert Table 3 about here // 
 
The results indicate that the models are highly significant with very high F-values. In the 
estimation, insider ownership is found to Granger-cause market value since lagged values of 
insider ownership have a significant effect on Q-values. However, the effect is significantly 
negative and not positive as hypothesised. In other words, hypothesis 1 is rejected. Secondly, 
market value is found to Granger-cause insider ownership since lagged Q-values have a 
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significant, negative effect on OS, which contradicts hypothesis 4. In other words, both 
hypotheses 1 and  4 are rejected. 
   
Secondly, we enlarged the model by allowing for random time and firm effects, i.e. we 
estimated the models: 
5.  Qit   =  a1 + b1 OSit +  b2 Qi(t-1) + li + nt + m´1,it 
6.  OSit =  a2 + b3 OSi(t-1) + b4 Qi(t-1) + fi + gt +  m
´
2,it 
where the random firm effects in each equation, li and fi, are independent with variances 
respectively s2Q, Firms  and s2OS, Firms  and means zero. Similarly, the random time effects within 
each equation, nt and gt, are independent with variances s2Q, Time and s2OS, Time and means 
zero. The errors, m´1,it and m´2,it, are still independent with variances s2j and means zero. 
Furthermore, the random firm effects, random time effects, and the errors are assumed to be 
independent.  
 
The enlargement of the model, in equations 5 and 6, thus lies in the error structure. In this 
model the random firm effects (that one can think of as random intercepts) correct for 
correlation between observations for a given firm (over the observed nine years) while the 
random time effects correct for correlation between observations at the same point in time. 
The random effects reflect the influence of unobserved variables characteristic for the 
individual firms (e.g. changes in strategy like mergers or sell offs) and the points in time (e.g. 
fluctuations of the market).  
 
The SAS Procedure TSCSREG (Time Series Cross Section Regression) with a variance 
component model that uses the Fuller-Battese method in the estimation (SAS 1999) is applied 
 
 16 
in order to estimate the model. The results of the estimation of the enlarged model with 
random time and firm effects are shown in Table 3, model II. A Hausman test is conducted in 
order to test whether adding the random effects improves the models, and for both models the 
Hausman test turns out to be highly significant. This indicates that the model with random 
firm and time effects gives a better fit of the data than a model without random effects. The 
split of the variance components shows that the significance of including the random effects 
is mainly due to the firm effects that are substantially larger than the time effects. 
 
Again, (as in Table 3, model I) lagged values of Q are found to exert a negative and 
significant influence on insider ownership, and insider ownership is found to have a negative 
and significant influence on Q-values. And again, Hypothesis 1 is rejected, whereas 
Hypothesis 4 cannot be rejected. 
 
Non-linear effects 
Previous cross-sectional studies have indicated that the effects of insider ownership on 
market value might be non-linear: for example positive for small levels of insider ownership 
because of increasing incentive alignment, but negative for high values of insider ownership 
because of increasing managerial entrenchment. In order to test this hypothesis we split the 
sample in two according to the initial level of insider ownership (low insider ownership < 10 
per cent and high insider ownership => 10 per cent). Table 4 shows the results of the 
estimation shown for both sub-samples. Model I shows the direct Granger test (equations 3 
and 4) with common slopes and intercepts for all firms. Table 4, model II shows the 
expanded model with random firm and time effects. As can be seen the qualitative results are 
very similar for the two models. So, although the Hausman test in model II indicates that the 
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model with random firm and time effects fits the data, adding the random effects does not 
change the results qualitatively. 
 
// Insert Table 4 about here // 
 
In the two models in Table 4 we find no significant effects of Q-values on ownership for low 
initial insider ownership, whereas the effect is significantly negative for high values of initial 
insider ownership. In other words, Hypothesis 2 cannot be rejected: the negative effects of 
insider ownership appear to apply only when the initial level is above average. 
 
System differences 
Another possible hypothesis is that the relationship between ownership and market valuation 
might depend on system effects. For example, Hypothesis 3 proposes that increasing insider 
ownership will have a more positive effect on market values in common law countries where 
the risk of expropriation of minority investors by insiders is checked by the greater legal 
protection.  An indirect effect of Hypothesis 2 might work in the same direction. Since the 
average level of insider ownership is much lower in the US/UK, companies in these systems 
are less likely to experience negative managerial entrenchment effects when insider 
ownership increases.  
 
In order to test Hypothesis 3, the Granger tests are first run separately for the common law 
countries (US/UK) and civil law countries (continental European nations) (shown in Table 5, 
model I and II). The estimates are with random time and firm effects (equations 5 and 6). In 
continental Europe, lagged values of Q are found to have no significant impact on insider 
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ownership, whereas insider ownership has a negative effect on valuation. In the US/UK 
neither the link from insider ownership to valuation nor the link from valuation to insider 
ownership are significant. In other words, Hypothesis 3 cannot be rejected since the effect of 
insider ownership on valuation is less negative or more positive in common law countries that 
are believed to offer better legal protection to minority investors.                                           
 
In order to establish whether this effect is attributable to high initial levels of ownership 
concentration, we break down both the civil law and common law samples by initial levels of 
ownership concentration (below or above the threshold of 10 per cent insider ownership). 
Table 5, model III shows the estimations for the sample with high initial insider ownership 
for both civil law and common law firms. We find that the negative effect of insider 
ownership effect in continental Europe is significant for high initial levels, while it is 
insignificant for low levels of initial insider ownership (not shown in the Table). In other 
words, there is some evidence that the system effect is attributable to (or at least co-varies 
with) a high level of insider ownership. Further analysis (Table 5, model III) shows that the 
insider ownership effect is insignificant in the US/UK - also for initial high levels. In other 
words, the negative effect of insider ownership on market valuation appears to be attributable 
to an interaction effect - the combined effect of high insider ownership in a continental 
European system. 
 
Some further, circumstantial support for Hypothesis 3 may be found by observing the time 
trends in insider ownership in continental Europe compared to the US/UK. If insider 
ownership were negatively correlated with market valuation in continental Europe, there 
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would seem to be an incentive to reduce insider ownership over time. This is what Figure 1 
shows. 
 
// Insert Figure 1 about here // 
 
After an increase at the end of the 1980s, insider ownership in Europe has declined steadily 
from 57 per cent in 1991 to 51 per cent in 1998. Over the same period, insider ownership in 
the US/UK increased steadily from 7 to 13 per cent - where the effect of insider ownership 
was found to be slightly positive (although insignificant).  In other words, there is some 
evidence that the level of insider ownership actually adapts to market signals. 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has contributed to the ongoing discussion on the causal link between ownership 
structure and market valuation. 
 
The results may be summarised as follows: for high levels of insider ownership, further 
increases are found to have a negative effect on market valuation. For low levels, the effect is 
insignificant.  Likewise, the effect is insignificant in common law countries (US/UK), where 
the legal protection of minority investors is said to be higher than in civil law countries 
(continental Europe). In contrast, the effect is negative and highly significant for high initial 
levels of insider ownership and for companies based in continental Europe where the risk of 
insider expropriation of minority investors is presumably higher. Finally, we find evidence of 
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a negative and significant feedback effect from market valuation to insider ownership, 
perhaps because insiders are more likely to sell out when they can get a higher price for their 
shares. 
 
Compared to previous studies of managerial ownership, the present study has relied on a 
broader concept of ”insider ownership”. This means that some of the positive effects of 
managerial ownership on market valuation may be attenuated or suppressed by more 
complicated effects of ownership concentration. Furthermore, this study has emphasised 
marginal change effects whereas level effects have presumably been neutralised by 
controlling for lagged values and adding random effects. For example, there may very well be 
positive effects of a high level of insider ownership while developments in the financial 
markets, monitoring technology, and other control factors have made it possible to increase 
shareholder value by marginally lowering that level. An assessment of the overall 
relationship between insider ownership and market value must involve both level and change 
effects. 
 
Taking the Demsetz (1983) critique into consideration, the observed negative effect of insider 
ownership may not be an equilibrium phenomenon, but rather a consequence of the 
restructuring of corporate governance and finance taking place in the largest European 
companies. Furthermore, hidden owner identity effects may be at work; many incumbent 
owners of the largest European companies - such as families, governments, banks or 
company groups - appear to have more complex objective functions than maximising 
shareholder value (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). When these groups reduce their holdings 
relative to outsider portfolio investors, the markets may (correctly) infer greater emphasis on 
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shareholder value. On the other hand, incumbent insiders may not want to adjust their 
holdings to maximise shareholder value if they also value the private utility associated with 
ownership. 
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Table 1. List of Empirical Variables. 
 
Code 
 
Description 
 
Definition 
 
Q 
 
Transformation of the sum of the market value 
of equity, and the book value of the total debt 
divided by the book value of assets 
 
Log ((Market price-year end * Common shares outstanding) + 
book value of total debt) / book value of total assets). 
 
LAGQ 
 
 
 
Lagged value of Q (one lag) 
 
ANGLO 
 
System. Headquarters based in an Anglo-
American common law system or in a 
continental-European civil law system 
 
Dummy=1 for common law countries (US, UK). 
             =0 for continental European civil law countries. (La Porta                 
et. al 1999a)               
 
OS 
 
Transformation of the fraction of closely held 
shares (chs).  Closely held shares are shares 
held by insiders including officers, directors 
(and their families), trust, pension/benefit 
plans, and shares held by another corporation 
or individuals that hold more than 5%. 
 
LOG (chs / (100-chs)) 
 
LAGOS 
 
 
 
Lagged value of OS (one lag) 
 
Source: The Worldscope Database (annually). 
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Table 2. Correlation matrix 
 
 
    1 2 3 4  
 
1) Insider ownership    1.00 
 
2) One lag of insider ownership  0.92***  1.00 
 
3) Q- value -0.11*** -0.11***  1.00 
 
4) One lag of Q-value -0.12*** -0.10***  0.96*** 1.00 
 
 
 
Mean -2.93 -2.97 -0.23 -0.25  
Standard Deviation  2.98  2.97  0.83  0.82 
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Table 3.  Granger Causality tests 
 
 
 
 
Model I 
 
Model II 
 
Dependent variable 
 
OS 
 
Q 
 
     OS 
 
Q 
 
Intercept 
 
-0.237*** 
 
-0.003 
 
-1.017*** 
 
-0.069*** 
 
Q (t-1)  
 
-0.072*** 
 
 0.956*** 
 
-0.119*** 
 
 0.703*** 
 
OS (t-1) 
 
 0.913*** 
 
 
 
 0.625*** 
 
 
 
OS (t) 
 
 
 
-0.006*** 
 
 
 
-0.004** 
 
   N (observations) 
   F-value 
 
  6768 
 18080*** 
 
 6768 
34719*** 
 
 
 
 
 
   N (firm-years) 
   Hausman test 
  
    Variance Components:  
- firms 
- time series 
- Error 
 
 
 
 
 
     6766 
     522*** 
    
 
      1.996 
      0.030 
      1.085 
 
   6766 
   530*** 
    
 
   0.104 
   0.005 
   0.040 
 
 
***, ** and * = significant at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively
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Table 4.  Granger Causality by initial level of insider ownership 
 
 
 
 
Model I 
 
Model II 
 
Initial level of insider 
ownership 
 
Low 
 
High 
 
Low 
 
High 
 
Dependent variable 
 
OS 
 
Q 
 
OS 
 
Q 
 
OS 
 
Q 
 
OS 
 
Q 
 
Intercept 
 
-0.769*** 
 
  0.028*** 
 
-0.173*** 
 
-0.006 
 
-1.736*** 
 
-0.002 ns 
 
-0.433 *** 
 
-0.0877*** 
 
Q (t-1)  
 
-0.101 
 
  0.960*** 
 
-0.105*** 
 
  0.960*** 
 
-0.0002  
 
0.756*** 
 
-0.208*** 
 
0.700*** 
 
OS (t-1) 
 
  0.842*** 
 
 
 
  0.839*** 
 
 
 
 0.656*** 
 
 
 
 0.572*** 
 
 
 
OS(t) 
 
 
 
-0.001 
 
 
 
-0.009*** 
 
 
 
0.0008  
 
 
 
-0.007** 
 
   N (observations) 
   F-value  
 
   3312 
   3195*** 
 
  3312 
 17782*** 
 
   2964 
  4592*** 
 
  2964 
  18024*** 
    
 
   N (firm-years) 
   Hausman test 
  
    Variance Components:  
- firms 
- time series 
- Error  
      3310 
 202*** 
 
 
 0.639 
 0.032 
 1.239 
 
 3310 
 197*** 
 
 
  0.068 
  0.006 
  0.031 
 
  2962 
  271*** 
 
 
  0.898 
  0.035 
  0.884 
 
  2962 
  282*** 
 
 
  0.114 
  0.004 
  0.044 
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Table 5.  Granger Causality Tests by System 
 
 
 
 
Model I 
 
Model II 
 
Model III 
High levels of initial insider ownership  
 
System 
 
Continental Europe 
 
US/UK 
 
Continental Europe 
 
US/UK 
 
Dependent variable 
 
OS 
 
Q 
 
OS 
 
Q 
 
OS 
 
Q 
 
OS 
 
Q 
 
Intercept 
 
-0.086 
 
-0.177*** 
 
-1.42*** 
 
0.011 
 
-0.008  
 
-0.192*** 
 
- 0.829*** 
 
0.032 
 
Q (t-1)  
 
-0.069 
 
0.702*** 
 
0.026 
 
0.700*** 
 
-0.057  
 
0.679*** 
 
-0.069 
 
0.718*** 
 
OS (t-1) 
 
0.621*** 
 
 
 
0.618 *** 
 
 
 
 0.594*** 
 
 
 
 0.548***  
 
 
 
OS(t) 
 
 
 
-0.013*** 
 
 
 
0.003  
 
 
 
- 0.018*** 
 
 
 
 0.001 
 
N (firm-years) 
Hausman test 
  
Variance 
Components:  
- firms 
- time series 
-    Error  
 
  1968 
  143*** 
 
 
 
   0.877 
   0.008 
   0.586 
 
 1968 
  166*** 
 
 
   
  0.094 
  0.007 
  0.041 
 
  4652 
  361*** 
 
 
   
  1.383 
  0.008 
  1.270 
 
 4652 
  351*** 
 
 
   
  0.092 
  0.006 
  0.038 
 
  1597 
  135*** 
 
 
    
   0.761 
   0.010 
   0.434 
 
  1597 
   149*** 
 
 
    
   0.106 
   0.006 
   0.041 
 
   1767 
   127*** 
 
 
   
   0.594 
   0.066 
   1.278 
 
   1767 
   126*** 
 
 
  
   0.083 
   0.005 
   0.043 
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Figure 1 
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